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STATE V. JOHNSON: TO WARRANT AN IN CAMERA 
REVIEW OF A VICTIM’S MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS, A 
DEFENDANT MUST OFFER A FACTUAL PREDICATE TO 
SHOW A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RECORDS 
CONTAIN EXCULPATORY INFORMATION. 
 
By: April L. Inskeep 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a defendant’s trial rights may 
trump a victim’s privilege to preclude mental health records, warranting an in 
camera review when the defendant establishes a reasonable likelihood that the 
records contain exculpatory information relevant to the defense.  State v. 
Johnson, 440 Md. 228, 231-32, 247, 102 A.3d 295, 297, 306 (2014).  The court 
further held that the defendant’s proffer of hypotheticals was insufficient to 
establish such likelihood and outweigh the victim’s privilege. Id. at 251, 102 
A.3d at 309-10.  
     Respondent, Jonathan Johnson (“Johnson”), was charged in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City with sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s son, “J.C.”  As 
a result of the alleged abuse, J.C. became a patient at National Pike Health 
Center, Inc. (“National Pike”).  Prior to trial, Johnson filed a subpoena duces 
tecum requiring National Pike to produce J.C.’s mental health records.  
National Pike resisted and filed a motion for protective order to effectively 
quash the subpoena and withhold the records.  During the subsequent motions 
hearing, defense counsel stated that he requested J.C.’s records in order to 
determine why J.C. was in treatment.  Counsel asserted that such records had 
the potential to include exculpatory information.  The judge noted that defense 
counsel’s request was nothing more than a fishing expedition. Defense counsel 
replied that the records may affect J.C.’s credibility, but he had “no idea” 
without knowing what the records contained.  The trial judge granted National 
Pike’s motion, finding that defense counsel’s proffer was insufficient to permit 
disclosure of the victim’s records.   
     Johnson was subsequently convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and 
second-degree sexual offense.  Johnson appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, which reversed his conviction.  The intermediate 
appellate court reasoned that Johnson’s proffer, stating the need to know J.C.’s 
“propensity for veracity,” was sufficient to establish the likelihood that the 
records would provide exculpatory information, thus warranting an in camera 
review.  The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, which was granted. 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by determining 
whether a defendant’s trial rights may trump a victim’s privilege in their 
mental health records.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 237, 102 A.3d at 30 (relying on 
Goldsmith v. State, 227 Md. 112, 651 A.2d 866 (1995)).  The court recognized 
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that a patient’s privilege to preclude the disclosure of his communications to a 
licensed psychiatrist is statutorily based.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 237-38, 102 
A.3d at 300 (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 9-109, 9-121).  
Pursuant to sections 9-109 and 9-121 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article, there was no dispute that the records were privileged records and J.C. 
had not waived his privilege.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 238, 102 A.3d at 301.  As 
a competing consideration, the court also recognized a defendant’s 
constitutional right to confrontation and compulsory process.  Id. at 241, 102 
A.3d at 302.  However, neither a victim’s privilege nor a defendant’s 
constitutional right are absolute.  Id. at 247, 102 A.3d at 306.  
     Having recognized that a patient’s privilege in their mental health records 
is not absolute, the court looked to Goldsmith v. State to determine when a 
defendant may obtain such privileged mental health records.  Johnson, 440 
Md. at 239-40, 102 A.3d at 301-02 (citing Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112, 
651 A.2d 866 (1995)).  Goldsmith presents three distinct scenarios when a 
defendant might request a victim’s records: ”(1) [P]retrial discovery of 
privileged information; (2) disclosure of merely confidential (rather than 
privileged) information; and (3) disclosure of privileged information at trial.”  
Johnson, 440 Md. at 240, 102 A.3d at 302.  Relying on Goldsmith, the court 
found that the first category is an absolute bar to disclosure, however, the 
second and third categories may be available to a criminal defendant if the 
required showing is made. Id. (citing Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 121, 127, 651 
A.2d at 870, 873).  The court noted that records may be available at trial 
because a trial judge is in a better position to balance and protect the interests 
of the parties.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 241, 102 A.3d at 302.  Unlike a pre-trial 
subpoena, a trial subpoena duces tecum allows a judge to discuss the records 
with mental health care providers.  Id. at 241, 102 A.3d at 302-03 (citing Md. 
Rule 4-264, 4-265; Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 131, 651 A.2d at 875).   
     Additionally, the court reviewed Jaffe v. Redmond to dispel the notion that 
Jaffee was inconsistent with Goldsmith.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 241-42, 102 
A.3d at 303 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996)).  
The court found that Jaffee did not cast doubt on Goldsmith because Jaffee 
was a civil case that did not involve a criminal defendant’s significant 
constitutional rights.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 242-43, 102 A.3d at 303.  Further, 
as the first Supreme Court case to recognize that a psychotherapist privilege 
may be abrogated, Jaffe does not provide an exhaustive list of all the 
circumstances when such abrogation could occur.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 243-
46, 102 A.3d at 304-06 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18, 116 S. Ct. at 1932).    
     Having determined that a defendant’s trial rights may trump the victim’s 
privilege, the court next decided when such a defendant will be entitled to an 
in camera review of the privileged records. Johnson, 440 Md. at 247, 102 A.3d 
at 306.  To warrant an in camera review of the records, a defendant must 
proffer sufficient facts to establish a reasonable likelihood that the records 
contain exculpatory information.  Id.  It is not enough for a defendant to 
suggest that the records “may contain evidence useful for impeachment on 
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cross-examination.”  Id. at 248, 103 A.3d at 307 (citing Goldsmith, 337 Md. 
at 133, 651 A.2d at 876; People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 576 (Mich. 
1994)).  The defendant bears the burden of convincing the trial judge that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the “records contain information that might 
influence the determination of guilt.” Johnson, 440 Md. at 250, 102 A.3d at 
308 (citing Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 369, 633 A.2d 355, 464 
(1993)).  If the threshold is not met, a trial judge should not review the 
privileged records.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 249, 102 A.3d at 307 (citing Fisher 
v. State, 128 Md. App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125 (1999)).  
     After clarifying that Maryland courts should apply Goldsmith, the court 
found that Johnson did not offer the necessary factual predicate to show a 
reasonable likelihood that J.C.’s records contained exculpatory information 
and reversed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.  Johnson, 440 
Md. at 250, 102 A.3d at 308.  Although knowing J.C.’s propensity for veracity 
may be helpful to Johnson’s defense, this fact alone does not meet the 
necessary threshold.  Id. at 253, 102 A.3d at 310.  If the court found such 
hypotheticals were sufficient, any assertion could provide access to the 
victim’s records and essentially nullify the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  
Id. at 251, 102 A.3d at 309.  The court went on to state that Johnson needed to 
“point to some fact outside the records that makes it reasonably likely the 
records contain exculpatory information.”  Id. at 252, 102 A.3d at 309.  Other 
jurisdictions have found such likelihood exists when a defendant produces 
evidence that the victim made prior inconsistent statements, when a victim 
exhibits strange behavior surrounding counseling sessions, or when there is 
evidence of past abuse.  Id. at 252-253, 102 A.3d at 309-10 (citing State v. 
Peseti, 1010 Haw. 172, 65 P.3d 119 (2003); Brooks v. State, 33 So. 3d 1262 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Burns v. State, 968 A.2d 1012 (Del. 2009); People v. 
Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994)).  
     In State v. Johnson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
defendant’s trial rights may trump a victim’s psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
and warrant an in camera review if the defendant establishes a reasonable 
likelihood that records contain exculpatory information relevant to the 
defense.  An in camera review is an appropriate safeguard in that it allows only 
the judge to review the records and determine relevancy before permitting the 
records in open court.  While attempting to balance the two competing 
interests, a defendant’s right to a fair trial and the victim’s right to privacy, the 
court presents an unworkable test.  For defense counsel to make a sufficient 
proffer during trial they must point to something outside of the victim-patient’s 
records that will convince the trial judge that there is a reasonable likelihood 
the records in question contain exculpatory evidence. This is an extremely 
arduous task without first having the opportunity to view the records. 
